irms operate in complex environments: a list of the categories in which irms operate in complex environments: a list of the categories in which they need to make interrelated choices would include employee pay, they need to make interrelated choices would include employee pay, pricing, product attributes, production technologies, and management. In pricing, product attributes, production technologies, and management. In turn, these decisions involve responding to characteristics that are often hard to turn, these decisions involve responding to characteristics that are often hard to measure or uncertain, such as those related to market characteristics, the producmeasure or uncertain, such as those related to market characteristics, the productivity of individual inputs, and entrepreneurial ability. Due to the complexity of tivity of individual inputs, and entrepreneurial ability. Due to the complexity of the environment, research that seeks to understand the behavior of fi rms based on the environment, research that seeks to understand the behavior of fi rms based on observational data faces many challenges at uncovering causal relationships. In this observational data faces many challenges at uncovering causal relationships. In this paper, we illustrate how fi eld experiments, guided by economic theory, can address paper, we illustrate how fi eld experiments, guided by economic theory, can address these challenges and provide new answers to long-standing questions about fi rms: these challenges and provide new answers to long-standing questions about fi rms: Do fi rm choices maximize profi ts subject to constraints? If so, which constraints Do fi rm choices maximize profi ts subject to constraints? If so, which constraints bind and inform decision making in fi rms? If not, why are fi rms operating inside bind and inform decision making in fi rms? If not, why are fi rms operating inside the frontier? the frontier?
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In this paper, we review fi eld experiments that provide preliminary answers to In this paper, we review fi eld experiments that provide preliminary answers to these questions and map directions for further research. We organize our discusthese questions and map directions for further research. We organize our discussion into two classes of work. The fi rst is fi eld experiments conducted sion into two classes of work. The fi rst is fi eld experiments conducted within fi rms, fi rms, in which the units of observation are workers or divisions of a fi rm. The theory in which the units of observation are workers or divisions of a fi rm. The theory behind many of these experiments views the fi rm as an organization, emphasizing behind many of these experiments views the fi rm as an organization, emphasizing agency problems. We discuss fi eld experiments that shed light on solutions to the agency problems. We discuss fi eld experiments that shed light on solutions to the agency problem, from incentive pay to social pressure and nonmonetary rewards. agency problem, from incentive pay to social pressure and nonmonetary rewards.
Field Experiments with Firms
Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, and Imran Rasul
The second strand covers fi eld experiments conducted The second strand covers fi eld experiments conducted between fi rms, in which the fi rms, in which the fi rm is the unit of observation. The theory behind most of these experiments views fi rm is the unit of observation. The theory behind most of these experiments views the fi rm through the lens of neoclassical production theory, and so we discuss the fi rm through the lens of neoclassical production theory, and so we discuss how fi eld experiments have exogenously varied input availability to shed light on how fi eld experiments have exogenously varied input availability to shed light on constraints fi rms face. constraints fi rms face.
Throughout, we focus on experiments designed to shed light on fi rms' behavior. Throughout, we focus on experiments designed to shed light on fi rms' behavior. This still leaves out a large class of fi eld experiments that are run in collaboration This still leaves out a large class of fi eld experiments that are run in collaboration with fi rms to provide evidence on other issues such as consumer behavior or optimal with fi rms to provide evidence on other issues such as consumer behavior or optimal auction design. auction design. Beyond the results of specifi c fi eld experiment studies, we also believe that Beyond the results of specifi c fi eld experiment studies, we also believe that economists can reap enormous benefi ts from establishing working partnerships economists can reap enormous benefi ts from establishing working partnerships with fi rms and engaging in primary data collection. Thus, we conclude the paper with fi rms and engaging in primary data collection. Thus, we conclude the paper by offering some discussion of the practical issues researchers face in designing and by offering some discussion of the practical issues researchers face in designing and implementing fi eld experiments in fi rms, and by highlighting research questions implementing fi eld experiments in fi rms, and by highlighting research questions that remain relatively untouched by fi eld experiments. We hope that by the end of that remain relatively untouched by fi eld experiments. We hope that by the end of our discussion, readers have a clear sense of the costs and benefi ts of fi eld experiour discussion, readers have a clear sense of the costs and benefi ts of fi eld experiments in fi rm settings, and are motivated to consider this approach themselves. ments in fi rm settings, and are motivated to consider this approach themselves.
Field Experiments within Firms Field Experiments within Firms
Field experiments within fi rms are generally designed to shed light on how Field experiments within fi rms are generally designed to shed light on how fi rms can solve agency problems and motivate their employees. In this section, we fi rms can solve agency problems and motivate their employees. In this section, we review evidence on the two classical solutions to this agency problem-monitoring review evidence on the two classical solutions to this agency problem-monitoring and pay for performance-as well as more recent work on nonmonetary determiand pay for performance-as well as more recent work on nonmonetary determinants of motivation such as social relations or status rewards. nants of motivation such as social relations or status rewards.
Although fi eld experiments within fi rms have experienced a recent resurgence, Although fi eld experiments within fi rms have experienced a recent resurgence, they are far from new. One of the fi rst series of fi eld experiments was conducted at they are far from new. One of the fi rst series of fi eld experiments was conducted at the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company, near Chicago, in the 1920s. the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company, near Chicago, in the 1920s. While the validity of their specifi c fi ndings has been questioned, While the validity of their specifi c fi ndings has been questioned, 2 2 these experiments these experiments lay the groundwork for many issues that are now considered part of mainstream lay the groundwork for many issues that are now considered part of mainstream personnel economics (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010a) . For example, they led Mayo personnel economics (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010a) . For example, they led Mayo (1933) to stress that workers are motivated by both monetary and nonmonetary (1933) to stress that workers are motivated by both monetary and nonmonetary rewards from work, an idea that is being tested by the newest generation of fi eld rewards from work, an idea that is being tested by the newest generation of fi eld experiments reviewed below. experiments reviewed below.
Monitoring and Shirking Monitoring and Shirking
The standard agency framework with asymmetric information views employees The standard agency framework with asymmetric information views employees as rational shirkers: that is, employees consider the marginal costs and marginal as rational shirkers: that is, employees consider the marginal costs and marginal benefi ts of shirking, and decide on their level of effort. Firms thus choose compenbenefi ts of shirking, and decide on their level of effort. Firms thus choose compensation and monitoring policies with shirking in mind. The theory suggests that a sation and monitoring policies with shirking in mind. The theory suggests that a reduction in monitoring will tend to an increase in shirking. Moreover, an increase reduction in monitoring will tend to an increase in shirking. Moreover, an increase in shirking resulting from reduced monitoring should be greatest among individuals in shirking resulting from reduced monitoring should be greatest among individuals for whom the ongoing employment relationship is least valuable. Three concerns for whom the ongoing employment relationship is least valuable. Three concerns have plagued nonexperimental approaches to testing these ideas: 1) shirking have plagued nonexperimental approaches to testing these ideas: 1) shirking behavior is hard to detect; 2) the ability of the econometrician to detect shirkers behavior is hard to detect; 2) the ability of the econometrician to detect shirkers might be endogenously related to the employer's monitoring practices; and might be endogenously related to the employer's monitoring practices; and 3) unobserved factors, such as hiring policies, may lead monitoring and shirking 3) unobserved factors, such as hiring policies, may lead monitoring and shirking outcomes to be correlated. outcomes to be correlated. Nagin, Rebitzer, Sanders, and Taylor (2002) address these challenges using Nagin, Rebitzer, Sanders, and Taylor (2002) address these challenges using a fi eld experiment run by a telephone solicitation fi rm across four of its 16 call a fi eld experiment run by a telephone solicitation fi rm across four of its 16 call centers. At each call center, telephone solicitors were paid a piece rate in which salary centers. At each call center, telephone solicitors were paid a piece rate in which salary increased with the number of "successful" solicitations-where success was reported increased with the number of "successful" solicitations-where success was reported by the employees themselves. This piece rate created incentives for employees to by the employees themselves. This piece rate created incentives for employees to overstate whether a donation had been promised. To curb opportunistic behavior, overstate whether a donation had been promised. To curb opportunistic behavior, the employer monitored by calling back a fraction of those who were reported to the employer monitored by calling back a fraction of those who were reported to have responded positively to a solicitation. Employees were informed when hired have responded positively to a solicitation. Employees were informed when hired that their activities would be checked by callbacks. The results of each week's callthat their activities would be checked by callbacks. The results of each week's callbacks were communicated to both employees and their immediate supervisors, and backs were communicated to both employees and their immediate supervisors, and calls found by the monitors to be unsuccessful were deducted from each individual's calls found by the monitors to be unsuccessful were deducted from each individual's weekly incentive pay. Stronger sanctions for such calls were not generally imposed weekly incentive pay. Stronger sanctions for such calls were not generally imposed on employees because it was understood that donors sometimes change their minds on employees because it was understood that donors sometimes change their minds after agreeing to pledge money. after agreeing to pledge money.
To see if the costs of this monitoring system could be reduced, the company To see if the costs of this monitoring system could be reduced, the company simulated a lower audit rate by experimentally varying the fraction of bad calls that simulated a lower audit rate by experimentally varying the fraction of bad calls that were reported back to employees and supervisors in the four experimental sites were reported back to employees and supervisors in the four experimental sites from 0 to 2 to 5 to 10 percent, while keeping the actual audit rate at 25 percent in from 0 to 2 to 5 to 10 percent, while keeping the actual audit rate at 25 percent in all four sites. By working with the fi rm, the researchers were able to collect survey all four sites. By working with the fi rm, the researchers were able to collect survey data on employee attitudes toward the job, their expected job tenure, and their data on employee attitudes toward the job, their expected job tenure, and their perceived diffi culty of fi nding a comparable job. perceived diffi culty of fi nding a comparable job.
The fi ndings indicate that workers' responses are very heterogeneous. Between The fi ndings indicate that workers' responses are very heterogeneous. Between 10 and 41 percent of the employees in the four experimental sites behave as 10 and 41 percent of the employees in the four experimental sites behave as "rational cheaters"-that is, they respond to a reduction in the perceived cost of "rational cheaters"-that is, they respond to a reduction in the perceived cost of opportunistic behavior by increasing the rate at which they shirk. The remaining opportunistic behavior by increasing the rate at which they shirk. The remaining 59 to 90 percent of employees, however, do not increase shirking following the 59 to 90 percent of employees, however, do not increase shirking following the reduction in monitoring rates. Using the survey data collected, the authors fi nd that reduction in monitoring rates. Using the survey data collected, the authors fi nd that those employees who responded to reductions in monitoring tended to be those those employees who responded to reductions in monitoring tended to be those who perceived the employer as being unfair and uncaring and that, in contrast with who perceived the employer as being unfair and uncaring and that, in contrast with the rational cheater model, individuals with good outside options did not increase the rational cheater model, individuals with good outside options did not increase shirking by more than other workers when the rate of monitoring declined. This shirking by more than other workers when the rate of monitoring declined. This heterogeneity implies that the optimal monitoring scheme will need to balance the heterogeneity implies that the optimal monitoring scheme will need to balance the requirement to reduce the shirking behavior of some workers inclined to rationally requirement to reduce the shirking behavior of some workers inclined to rationally cheat, against the desire to avoid monitoring costs for those unlikely to cheat under cheat, against the desire to avoid monitoring costs for those unlikely to cheat under normal circumstances. normal circumstances.
Monetary Incentives Monetary Incentives
In the many circumstances in which monitoring is not practically feasible, In the many circumstances in which monitoring is not practically feasible, the agency problem can be addressed by designing incentive schemes that seek to the agency problem can be addressed by designing incentive schemes that seek to align the employees' interests with the principal's. A wide class of schemes such as align the employees' interests with the principal's. A wide class of schemes such as piece rates, bonuses, and prizes achieve this goal by making the employees' pay an piece rates, bonuses, and prizes achieve this goal by making the employees' pay an increasing function of their performance. increasing function of their performance.
Agency theory makes precise that such "pay for performance" schemes affect Agency theory makes precise that such "pay for performance" schemes affect productivity both by increasing the productivity of existing employees (the incenproductivity both by increasing the productivity of existing employees (the incentive effect) and by attracting more-productive employees to the fi rm (the selection tive effect) and by attracting more-productive employees to the fi rm (the selection effect). The incentive effect arises because pay-for-performance schemes increase effect). The incentive effect arises because pay-for-performance schemes increase the marginal benefi t of effort, which leads employees to work harder, other things the marginal benefi t of effort, which leads employees to work harder, other things equal. The selection effect arises because high-ability employees who are capable equal. The selection effect arises because high-ability employees who are capable of achieving high performance can achieve higher pay and are, thus, attracted by of achieving high performance can achieve higher pay and are, thus, attracted by schemes that reward performance, other things equal. Both the incentive and selecschemes that reward performance, other things equal. Both the incentive and selection effects increase the variance as well as the mean of productivity and pay, as tion effects increase the variance as well as the mean of productivity and pay, as more-able workers can respond more to the increase in incentive power. more-able workers can respond more to the increase in incentive power.
Testing the rich predictions of agency theory using nonexperimental data faces Testing the rich predictions of agency theory using nonexperimental data faces serious econometric challenges, most importantly that observed incentive contracts serious econometric challenges, most importantly that observed incentive contracts might be endogenous to fi rm performance (Prendergast, 1999; Chiappori and might be endogenous to fi rm performance (Prendergast, 1999; Chiappori and Salanié, 2003) . Field experimenters can tackle this challenge directly by engineering Salanié, 2003) . Field experimenters can tackle this challenge directly by engineering exogenous changes in incentive schemes across, or most commonly, within fi rms. exogenous changes in incentive schemes across, or most commonly, within fi rms. Moreover, high-powered incentive schemes might affect productivity through chanMoreover, high-powered incentive schemes might affect productivity through channels that are typically not measured in secondary data. For instance, the increase nels that are typically not measured in secondary data. For instance, the increase in pay inequality can reduce workers' morale and lead to sabotage, or the change in pay inequality can reduce workers' morale and lead to sabotage, or the change in the composition of the peer group due to the selection effect might affect in the composition of the peer group due to the selection effect might affect workers' behavior over and above the effect of the compensation scheme. Field workers' behavior over and above the effect of the compensation scheme. Field experimenters are well placed to work with fi rms to collect primary data on the experimenters are well placed to work with fi rms to collect primary data on the relevance of these mechanisms, for instance by measuring social ties within the fi rm. relevance of these mechanisms, for instance by measuring social ties within the fi rm.
Among the fi rst of the fi eld experiments designed to measure incentive effects Among the fi rst of the fi eld experiments designed to measure incentive effects of monetary compensation schemes is that of Shearer (2004) , who estimates of monetary compensation schemes is that of Shearer (2004) , who estimates the productivity gains moving from a fi xed wage to a piece rate scheme for tree the productivity gains moving from a fi xed wage to a piece rate scheme for tree planters in British Columbia, Canada. Workers were randomly assigned to plant planters in British Columbia, Canada. Workers were randomly assigned to plant under one of the incentive schemes at the start of a work day. Workers' productivity under one of the incentive schemes at the start of a work day. Workers' productivity increased by 20 percent moving from fi xed wages to piece rates. In line with the increased by 20 percent moving from fi xed wages to piece rates. In line with the prediction of agency theory, the standard deviation of output across workers was prediction of agency theory, the standard deviation of output across workers was higher under piece rates. Shearer also develops and estimates a structural model higher under piece rates. Shearer also develops and estimates a structural model of workers' behavior to shed light on: 1) what would have been the productivity of workers' behavior to shed light on: 1) what would have been the productivity gains if management had been imperfectly informed about planting conditions; gains if management had been imperfectly informed about planting conditions; and 2) how workers would have responded to an effi ciency wage scheme. This is a and 2) how workers would have responded to an effi ciency wage scheme. This is a "natural fi eld experiment," to use the terminology explained in the introduction to "natural fi eld experiment," to use the terminology explained in the introduction to this symposium and in Harrison and List (2004) , because the workers did not know this symposium and in Harrison and List (2004) , because the workers did not know that the experiment was occurring. that the experiment was occurring.
Combining research methods like this is to be encouraged. In many scenarios, Combining research methods like this is to be encouraged. In many scenarios, it would be ideal to combine evidence from fi eld experiments with structural it would be ideal to combine evidence from fi eld experiments with structural modeling to posit an underlying behavioral mechanism behind the effects, to assess modeling to posit an underlying behavioral mechanism behind the effects, to assess the sensitivity of the estimates to slight alterations in the economic environment, the sensitivity of the estimates to slight alterations in the economic environment, and to make headway in understanding the optimal compensation structures. Of and to make headway in understanding the optimal compensation structures. Of course, the validity of the structural model can itself be tested by exploring whether course, the validity of the structural model can itself be tested by exploring whether it predicts the responses observed to the exogenous variation engineered by the it predicts the responses observed to the exogenous variation engineered by the fi eld experiment. For example, Cho and Rust (2010) follow this approach in using fi eld experiment. For example, Cho and Rust (2010) follow this approach in using a fi eld experiment to validate a structural model of rental rates for automobiles. a fi eld experiment to validate a structural model of rental rates for automobiles.
While recent fi eld experiments have made substantial progress in identifying the While recent fi eld experiments have made substantial progress in identifying the causal effect of performance pay on workers' effort, they have been less successful at causal effect of performance pay on workers' effort, they have been less successful at pinning down selection effects. pinning down selection effects.
3 3 This is a priority for future research as the available This is a priority for future research as the available nonexperimental evidence suggests that selection effects are at least as important nonexperimental evidence suggests that selection effects are at least as important as incentive effects. In a nonexperimental study that exploits the roll-out of a new as incentive effects. In a nonexperimental study that exploits the roll-out of a new piece rate scheme in a manufacturing fi rm, Lazear (2000) shows that selection piece rate scheme in a manufacturing fi rm, Lazear (2000) shows that selection effects explain half of the 44 percent increase in worker productivity that followed effects explain half of the 44 percent increase in worker productivity that followed the introduction of piece rates. However, identifying selection effects poses a diffi cult the introduction of piece rates. However, identifying selection effects poses a diffi cult challenge for fi eld experimenters both because it requires information on the entire challenge for fi eld experimenters both because it requires information on the entire pool of potential employees and because the time horizon of fi eld experiments is pool of potential employees and because the time horizon of fi eld experiments is often considerably shorter than that needed for existing workers to quit and new often considerably shorter than that needed for existing workers to quit and new workers to join a fi rm. Varying incentives across divisions or plants of the same fi rm workers to join a fi rm. Varying incentives across divisions or plants of the same fi rm while allowing employees to move across divisions might be a way to address both while allowing employees to move across divisions might be a way to address both issues. Greater knowledge about selection effects would also help in understanding issues. Greater knowledge about selection effects would also help in understanding whether and how the compensation policies of a given fi rm have spillover effects on whether and how the compensation policies of a given fi rm have spillover effects on other fi rms that compete for similar workers-which in turn would help tie together other fi rms that compete for similar workers-which in turn would help tie together the two disparate literatures on within-fi rm compensation policies and equilibrium the two disparate literatures on within-fi rm compensation policies and equilibrium wage-setting behavior. wage-setting behavior.
Monetary Incentives and the Social Organization of the Workplace Monetary Incentives and the Social Organization of the Workplace
Until recently, the importance of the interaction between social relations and Until recently, the importance of the interaction between social relations and monetary incentives in the workplace has been addressed mainly in the organizamonetary incentives in the workplace has been addressed mainly in the organizational and business sociology literatures. However, such concerns have begun to tional and business sociology literatures. However, such concerns have begun to be incorporated in economic theory; for example, Kandel and Lazear (1992) and be incorporated in economic theory; for example, Kandel and Lazear (1992) and Rotemberg (1994) extend standard agency models to take into account peer effects Rotemberg (1994) extend standard agency models to take into account peer effects and social concerns. Moreover, credible evidence on the existence and magnitude and social concerns. Moreover, credible evidence on the existence and magnitude of such social mechanisms has begun to emerge using nonexperimental methods in of such social mechanisms has begun to emerge using nonexperimental methods in combination with personnel data (Mas and Moretti, 2009; Bandiera, Barankay, and combination with personnel data (Mas and Moretti, 2009; Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul, 2010) . Identifying the causal effects of social relations using nonexperimental . Identifying the causal effects of social relations using nonexperimental data faces two main challenges: 1) the observed variation in incentives might be data faces two main challenges: 1) the observed variation in incentives might be correlated with other unobservable determinants of performance; and 2) fi rm correlated with other unobservable determinants of performance; and 2) fi rm personnel records rarely contain information on social connections within the fi rm. personnel records rarely contain information on social connections within the fi rm. 4 4 In this section, we discuss a series of three of our own fi eld experiments In this section, we discuss a series of three of our own fi eld experiments (Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul, 2005 , 2009 that provide novel evidence (Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul, 2005 , 2009 that provide novel evidence on the interplay of incentives and the social organization of the workplace, namely on the interplay of incentives and the social organization of the workplace, namely the social relations that exist between a group of coworkers or between workers the social relations that exist between a group of coworkers or between workers and managers. The fi rm we study is a leading U.K. producer of "soft fruit"-a and managers. The fi rm we study is a leading U.K. producer of "soft fruit"-a broad category that might include fruits like plums, cherries, peaches, strawberries, broad category that might include fruits like plums, cherries, peaches, strawberries, raspberries, and grapes. The fi rm's hierarchy has four layers: the owner and chief raspberries, and grapes. The fi rm's hierarchy has four layers: the owner and chief executive offi cer, the general manager, fi eld managers, and workers. The main task executive offi cer, the general manager, fi eld managers, and workers. The main task of the bottom-tier workers is to pick fruit. Around 40 workers pick on any given fi eld of the bottom-tier workers is to pick fruit. Around 40 workers pick on any given fi eld on a given day. Within a fi eld, workers are allocated their own row of fruit to pick, on a given day. Within a fi eld, workers are allocated their own row of fruit to pick, and worker's productivity is defi ned as kilograms picked per hour. Managers orgaand worker's productivity is defi ned as kilograms picked per hour. Managers organize fi eld logistics: for example, they assign workers to rows and make sure workers' nize fi eld logistics: for example, they assign workers to rows and make sure workers' full crates are replaced with empty ones. Managers also choose how much effort full crates are replaced with empty ones. Managers also choose how much effort to exert and how to allocate this effort among different workers. In this setting, to exert and how to allocate this effort among different workers. In this setting, managerial effort is complementary to worker's effort; for example, if a manager managerial effort is complementary to worker's effort; for example, if a manager reassigns a worker to a new row as soon as that worker is done with the previous one reassigns a worker to a new row as soon as that worker is done with the previous one and removes that worker's full crates quickly, then even for a given effort level of the and removes that worker's full crates quickly, then even for a given effort level of the worker, the worker will be more productive. worker, the worker will be more productive.
The general manager, who is a permanent employee of the farm, decides which The general manager, who is a permanent employee of the farm, decides which of the workers present on the farm are selected to pick fruit each day, which are of the workers present on the farm are selected to pick fruit each day, which are assigned to non-picking tasks, and which are left unemployed for the day. assigned to non-picking tasks, and which are left unemployed for the day.
In our setting, workers and managers are hired seasonally from Eastern In our setting, workers and managers are hired seasonally from Eastern Europe and live on the farm for the duration of their stay; thus, they have opporEurope and live on the farm for the duration of their stay; thus, they have opportunities to form social connections. These connections can be measured by asking tunities to form social connections. These connections can be measured by asking workers to report colleagues to whom they are socially linked, or indirectly by workers to report colleagues to whom they are socially linked, or indirectly by using common characteristics-like a common language-that predict social using common characteristics-like a common language-that predict social links. In two of the three experimental seasons, the group of coworkers that a links. In two of the three experimental seasons, the group of coworkers that a given worker is assigned to work with varies across fi elds and days, and this variagiven worker is assigned to work with varies across fi elds and days, and this variation is orthogonal to other determinants of productivity. This creates plausibly tion is orthogonal to other determinants of productivity. This creates plausibly exogenous variation in the presence of socially connected workers that can be exogenous variation in the presence of socially connected workers that can be used to identify the effect of social connections on behavior and productivity. used to identify the effect of social connections on behavior and productivity.
Our three The workforce changes annually, so that workers and managers are exposed The workforce changes annually, so that workers and managers are exposed to one experiment only. Each experiment induces exogenously timed changes to to one experiment only. Each experiment induces exogenously timed changes to the incentive structure of one layer of the hierarchy. In all cases the experimental the incentive structure of one layer of the hierarchy. In all cases the experimental treatments are applied simultaneously to all relevant agents. The rationale behind treatments are applied simultaneously to all relevant agents. The rationale behind the within-subject design is that, like most other fi rm settings, it was impossible to the within-subject design is that, like most other fi rm settings, it was impossible to prevent information spillovers between treated and control groups. Moreover, the prevent information spillovers between treated and control groups. Moreover, the composition of the workforce is fi xed for the duration of each season, thus we focus composition of the workforce is fi xed for the duration of each season, thus we focus on incentive rather than selection effects throughout. One aspect of the experion incentive rather than selection effects throughout. One aspect of the experimental design is that time-varying unobservables represent the main identifi cation mental design is that time-varying unobservables represent the main identifi cation threat. This is addressed by allowing fl exible interactions with time effects and by threat. This is addressed by allowing fl exible interactions with time effects and by using difference-in-differences estimators that combine data from the experimental using difference-in-differences estimators that combine data from the experimental seasons and from 2004, during which no experiments were implemented. seasons and from 2004, during which no experiments were implemented.
In our fi rst experiment, we exogenously varied the workers' compensation In our fi rst experiment, we exogenously varied the workers' compensation scheme from "relative compensation" to piece rates. Under relative compensation, scheme from "relative compensation" to piece rates. Under relative compensation, workers are paid a unit price for each kilogram of fruit picked that is negatively workers are paid a unit price for each kilogram of fruit picked that is negatively related to average productivity on the fi eld-day-thus, if average productivity on related to average productivity on the fi eld-day-thus, if average productivity on a certain day was high, the unit price paid to workers is lower. Under piece rates, a certain day was high, the unit price paid to workers is lower. Under piece rates, workers are paid for each kilogram of fruit picked. Under relative compensation, workers are paid for each kilogram of fruit picked. Under relative compensation, each worker imposes a negative externality on colleagues: any worker who increases each worker imposes a negative externality on colleagues: any worker who increases effort will raise average productivity and so reduce the unit wage for all coworkers effort will raise average productivity and so reduce the unit wage for all coworkers on the fi eld. Under piece rates, this externality does not exist. As a consequence, on the fi eld. Under piece rates, this externality does not exist. As a consequence, under relative compensation, the socially optimal level of effort is lower than the under relative compensation, the socially optimal level of effort is lower than the private optimum, whereas under piece rates, the two coincide. The comparison of private optimum, whereas under piece rates, the two coincide. The comparison of productivity under the two schemes reveals whether, and to what extent, workers are productivity under the two schemes reveals whether, and to what extent, workers are able to cooperate. able to cooperate.
In our 2005 paper, we show that productivity is 50 percent higher under In our 2005 paper, we show that productivity is 50 percent higher under piece rates. Calibration of the maximization conditions of worker's individual piece rates. Calibration of the maximization conditions of worker's individual effort choice problem reveals this productivity differential to be consistent with effort choice problem reveals this productivity differential to be consistent with the assumption that under relative incentives, workers internalize the negative the assumption that under relative incentives, workers internalize the negative externality their effort imposes on coworkers. This social incentive is equivaexternality their effort imposes on coworkers. This social incentive is equivalent to them placing a weight of two-thirds on all coworkers' pay. We fi nd that lent to them placing a weight of two-thirds on all coworkers' pay. We fi nd that workers internalize the externality more when they work alongside their friends workers internalize the externality more when they work alongside their friends as opposed to colleagues to whom they are not socially linked, and this effect is as opposed to colleagues to whom they are not socially linked, and this effect is larger in smaller groups. Yet, the effects disappear under piece rates. Finally, we larger in smaller groups. Yet, the effects disappear under piece rates. Finally, we fi nd that cooperation collapses when workers cannot monitor each other; specififi nd that cooperation collapses when workers cannot monitor each other; specifically, moving to piece rates does not increase workers' productivity when they cally, moving to piece rates does not increase workers' productivity when they pick from a plant whose physical characteristics make it diffi cult for a worker to pick from a plant whose physical characteristics make it diffi cult for a worker to see colleagues. This fi nding rules out pure altruism as a mechanism to sustain see colleagues. This fi nding rules out pure altruism as a mechanism to sustain cooperation in this setting. cooperation in this setting.
Our second experiment exogenously varied managers' pay from fi xed wages Our second experiment exogenously varied managers' pay from fi xed wages to fi xed wages plus a performance bonus that increases in the average producto fi xed wages plus a performance bonus that increases in the average productivity of the workers managed. In this experiment, workers were paid piece rates tivity of the workers managed. In this experiment, workers were paid piece rates throughout. Our 2007 paper shows that the introduction of managerial bonuses throughout. Our 2007 paper shows that the introduction of managerial bonuses increases both the mean and the dispersion of workers' productivity. One reason, increases both the mean and the dispersion of workers' productivity. One reason, as theory suggests, is that after the introduction of performance pay, managers as theory suggests, is that after the introduction of performance pay, managers targeted their effort towards more-able workers. Another reason, again suggested targeted their effort towards more-able workers. Another reason, again suggested by theory, is that workers with the highest productivity were more likely to be by theory, is that workers with the highest productivity were more likely to be selected into the workforce when managers were paid performance bonuses. Least selected into the workforce when managers were paid performance bonuses. Least able workers were employed less often and workers at the bottom of the producable workers were employed less often and workers at the bottom of the productivity distribution were never selected to pick. tivity distribution were never selected to pick.
Our 2009 paper further analyzed the data from this second experiment, with Our 2009 paper further analyzed the data from this second experiment, with a focus on the interplay between managerial incentives and the social connections a focus on the interplay between managerial incentives and the social connections between workers and managers. We fi nd evidence that when managers were paid between workers and managers. We fi nd evidence that when managers were paid fi xed wages, they targeted workers to whom they were socially connected, regardless fi xed wages, they targeted workers to whom they were socially connected, regardless of ability level. When managers were paid as a function of fi rm performance, they of ability level. When managers were paid as a function of fi rm performance, they targeted high-ability workers, regardless of social connections. The fi ndings suggest targeted high-ability workers, regardless of social connections. The fi ndings suggest that social connections have a sizable impact on productivity: when managers were that social connections have a sizable impact on productivity: when managers were paid fi xed wages, the average worker was 9 percent more productive on days when paid fi xed wages, the average worker was 9 percent more productive on days when they were managed by someone to whom they were socially connected. they were managed by someone to whom they were socially connected.
Our third experiment evaluates different compensation schemes under team Our third experiment evaluates different compensation schemes under team production. From 2005 onwards, workers were organized in teams of fi ve. Workers production. From 2005 onwards, workers were organized in teams of fi ve. Workers were allowed to choose the composition of their team as long as all fi ve members were allowed to choose the composition of their team as long as all fi ve members agreed. Compared to previous seasons, the social organization of the workplace agreed. Compared to previous seasons, the social organization of the workplace is thus endogenous. In Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2011), we compare three is thus endogenous. In Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2011), we compare three forms of team incentives: team piece rates, rank incentives (namely publicly forms of team incentives: team piece rates, rank incentives (namely publicly provided information on each team's productivity), and monetary prizes assigned provided information on each team's productivity), and monetary prizes assigned to the most productive teams. The experiment is again closely tied to an underlying to the most productive teams. The experiment is again closely tied to an underlying model that suggests two key forces that drive team formation: workers' ability and model that suggests two key forces that drive team formation: workers' ability and social connections. On one hand, workers have incentives to match by ability. On social connections. On one hand, workers have incentives to match by ability. On the other hand, workers might prefer to form teams with friends, both because the other hand, workers might prefer to form teams with friends, both because this might limit free-riding within teams and also because they enjoy nonpecuniary this might limit free-riding within teams and also because they enjoy nonpecuniary benefi ts from interacting with coworkers to whom they are socially connected. Our benefi ts from interacting with coworkers to whom they are socially connected. Our experiment is designed to exogenously alter the trade-off to sorting into teams by experiment is designed to exogenously alter the trade-off to sorting into teams by friendship relative to ability. friendship relative to ability.
We show that strengthening incentives, either through rank incentives or We show that strengthening incentives, either through rank incentives or monetary prizes, makes workers more likely to form teams with others of similar monetary prizes, makes workers more likely to form teams with others of similar ability instead of with their friends. However, rank incentives and monetary prizes ability instead of with their friends. However, rank incentives and monetary prizes have opposite effects on average productivity: rank incentives signifi cantly reduce have opposite effects on average productivity: rank incentives signifi cantly reduce it by 14 percent, while monetary prizes signifi cantly increase it by 24 percent. Both it by 14 percent, while monetary prizes signifi cantly increase it by 24 percent. Both effects are heterogeneous: rank incentives only reduce the productivity of teams at effects are heterogeneous: rank incentives only reduce the productivity of teams at the bottom of the productivity distribution, and monetary prizes only increase the the bottom of the productivity distribution, and monetary prizes only increase the productivity of teams at the top. Focusing on the teams that remain intact after each productivity of teams at the top. Focusing on the teams that remain intact after each change in incentives, we show that the documented negative effect of rank incenchange in incentives, we show that the documented negative effect of rank incentives is primarily due to the endogenous changes in team composition, rather than tives is primarily due to the endogenous changes in team composition, rather than changes in behavior of the same team. In contrast, the provision of monetary prizes changes in behavior of the same team. In contrast, the provision of monetary prizes affects fi rm performance through both the endogenous changes in team composiaffects fi rm performance through both the endogenous changes in team composition and changes in behavior within the same team. tion and changes in behavior within the same team.
Taken together, this set of fi eld experiments yields several lessons. Social Taken together, this set of fi eld experiments yields several lessons. Social connections can drive behavior in the workplace: workers and managers internalize connections can drive behavior in the workplace: workers and managers internalize the effect of their effort on colleagues to whom they are socially connected. Morethe effect of their effort on colleagues to whom they are socially connected. Moreover, social connections and monetary incentives interact, and the extent to which over, social connections and monetary incentives interact, and the extent to which agents internalize the externality depends on the strength of monetary incentives. agents internalize the externality depends on the strength of monetary incentives. Firms should take these potential interactions into account. Indeed, such differFirms should take these potential interactions into account. Indeed, such differences in the social organization of workplaces might help explain some part of ences in the social organization of workplaces might help explain some part of the productivity differences in otherwise observationally similar fi rms. This set of the productivity differences in otherwise observationally similar fi rms. This set of experiments also illustrates the advantages of combining the variation exogenously experiments also illustrates the advantages of combining the variation exogenously created by the fi eld experimenter (the incentive scheme) with other sources of created by the fi eld experimenter (the incentive scheme) with other sources of variation that occur naturally in a real-world environment (social ties, monitoring variation that occur naturally in a real-world environment (social ties, monitoring possibilities, peer groups). This combination of experimental rigor and collecting possibilities, peer groups). This combination of experimental rigor and collecting primary data is perhaps the most attractive feature of fi eld experiments. primary data is perhaps the most attractive feature of fi eld experiments.
The fi ndings open up new questions for theoretical research on organizations.
The fi ndings open up new questions for theoretical research on organizations. For instance, relative incentives led to lower productivity because workers internalFor instance, relative incentives led to lower productivity because workers internalized the negative externality to some extent. This fi nding speaks directly to Lazear's ized the negative externality to some extent. This fi nding speaks directly to Lazear's (1989) observation that workers are rarely compensated according to rank-order (1989) observation that workers are rarely compensated according to rank-order tournaments, and it points to new and interesting directions for the development of tournaments, and it points to new and interesting directions for the development of theory concerning the optimal provision of incentives under more-robust assumptheory concerning the optimal provision of incentives under more-robust assumptions on worker preferences. More broadly, the fi ndings raise the issue of whether tions on worker preferences. More broadly, the fi ndings raise the issue of whether incentive policies are indeed chosen optimally, or whether fi rms are effectively incentive policies are indeed chosen optimally, or whether fi rms are effectively within the effi ciency frontier. As we shall see, other fi eld experiments also cast doubt within the effi ciency frontier. As we shall see, other fi eld experiments also cast doubt on whether fi rms make optimal choices. The concluding section will bring these on whether fi rms make optimal choices. The concluding section will bring these together and discuss implications for future research. together and discuss implications for future research.
New Topics in Within-Firm Field Experiments New Topics in Within-Firm Field Experiments
A vigorous literature based on within-fi rm fi eld experiments is beginning to A vigorous literature based on within-fi rm fi eld experiments is beginning to emerge. Some of the topics focus on organizational features of fi rms, extending emerge. Some of the topics focus on organizational features of fi rms, extending the kind of approaches discussed above. For example, new fi eld experiments are the kind of approaches discussed above. For example, new fi eld experiments are being designed to test alternative ways to motivate employees. A natural candidate being designed to test alternative ways to motivate employees. A natural candidate is nonmonetary incentives in the form of status or social recognition rewards, such is nonmonetary incentives in the form of status or social recognition rewards, such as "employee of the month" job titles. The notion that individuals crave status has as "employee of the month" job titles. The notion that individuals crave status has long been studied and more recently formalized (Moldovanu, Sela, and Shi, 2007 ; long been studied and more recently formalized (Moldovanu, Sela, and Shi, 2007; Besley and Ghatak, 2008) . In a fi eld experiment run in collaboration with a public Besley and Ghatak, 2008) . In a fi eld experiment run in collaboration with a public health organization, Ashraf, Bandiera, and Jack (2011) randomize 800 commuhealth organization, Ashraf, Bandiera, and Jack (2011) randomize 800 community agents hired to sell condoms in urban compounds into four monetary and nity agents hired to sell condoms in urban compounds into four monetary and nonmonetary rewards treatments. Agents who are assigned to the nonmonetary nonmonetary rewards treatments. Agents who are assigned to the nonmonetary rewards treatment-namely, stars for performance plus a public ceremony for rewards treatment-namely, stars for performance plus a public ceremony for top performers-sell twice as many condoms as agents who are offered a fi nancial top performers-sell twice as many condoms as agents who are offered a fi nancial margin on each pack sold. margin on each pack sold.
Another personnel policy that is being subject to experimental scrutiny is the Another personnel policy that is being subject to experimental scrutiny is the provision of performance feedback. In a recent fi eld experiment conducted with provision of performance feedback. In a recent fi eld experiment conducted with 330 employees recruited via Mechanical Turk, a platform run by Amazon.com 330 employees recruited via Mechanical Turk, a platform run by Amazon.com for work submitted online, Barankay (2010) fi nds that the provision of indifor work submitted online, Barankay (2010) fi nds that the provision of individual performance feedback about relative performance reduces the productivity vidual performance feedback about relative performance reduces the productivity of workers. of workers.
Despite rapid progress in these areas, evidence on other key organizational Despite rapid progress in these areas, evidence on other key organizational features is still lagging behind theory. The best example is perhaps the distribution features is still lagging behind theory. The best example is perhaps the distribution of authority within fi rms, which has been at the core of theoretical studies of the of authority within fi rms, which has been at the core of theoretical studies of the fi rms since Coase's (1937) seminal contribution. Modern theoretical work highfi rms since Coase's (1937) seminal contribution. Modern theoretical work highlights the role of authority as a determinant of incentives (Aghion and Tirole, 1997) lights the role of authority as a determinant of incentives (Aghion and Tirole, 1997) or as a coordination device (Garicano, 2000; Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek, or as a coordination device (Garicano, 2000; Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek, 2008) . We envisage future fi eld experiments designed to shed light on the effect of 2008). We envisage future fi eld experiments designed to shed light on the effect of organizational design on fi rm performance. organizational design on fi rm performance.
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Field Experiments across Firms Field Experiments across Firms
Field experiments that take the fi rm as the unit of observation often seek to Field experiments that take the fi rm as the unit of observation often seek to exogenously vary the availability of key inputs and in this way seek to uncover the exogenously vary the availability of key inputs and in this way seek to uncover the constraints faced by fi rms. Many of the experiments reviewed in this section are constraints faced by fi rms. Many of the experiments reviewed in this section are implemented in developing countries from South Asia to Latin America, both implemented in developing countries from South Asia to Latin America, both because identifying the constraints faced by these fi rms is key to understanding the because identifying the constraints faced by these fi rms is key to understanding the development process and because, in practical terms, it is cheaper to create sizable development process and because, in practical terms, it is cheaper to create sizable shocks to inputs when the value of a fi rms' stock of inputs is small. shocks to inputs when the value of a fi rms' stock of inputs is small.
Physical Capital and Access to Finance Physical Capital and Access to Finance
A fi eld experiment by de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008) among small A fi eld experiment by de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008) among small and medium enterprises in Sri Lanka illustrates how fi eld experiments can illumiand medium enterprises in Sri Lanka illustrates how fi eld experiments can illuminate the long-standing question of how credit market imperfections and liquidity nate the long-standing question of how credit market imperfections and liquidity constraints may affect fi rm growth. They sample 408 enterprises, equally split constraints may affect fi rm growth. They sample 408 enterprises, equally split between retail sales and manufacturing/services, that have less than $1,000 invested between retail sales and manufacturing/services, that have less than $1,000 invested in capital. Around half were randomly assigned to receive one of four treatments: in capital. Around half were randomly assigned to receive one of four treatments: $100 in cash, $200 in cash, $100 in inventories or equipment, or $200 in inventories $100 in cash, $200 in cash, $100 in inventories or equipment, or $200 in inventories or equipment-in the last two treatments, as chosen by the fi rm owner. These transor equipment-in the last two treatments, as chosen by the fi rm owner. These transfers are large compared to the existing capital stock and median monthly profi ts. fers are large compared to the existing capital stock and median monthly profi ts. The experiment was accompanied by a quarterly panel survey on investment deciThe experiment was accompanied by a quarterly panel survey on investment decisions, profi ts, and also personal characteristics of the owner such as wealth, risk sions, profi ts, and also personal characteristics of the owner such as wealth, risk aversion, and cognitive ability. The experiment was framed as random compensaaversion, and cognitive ability. The experiment was framed as random compensation for participation in the survey. Hence owners did not know about the existence tion for participation in the survey. Hence owners did not know about the existence or scope of the experiment. or scope of the experiment.
The experiment yields three key fi ndings. First, both types of transfers increase The experiment yields three key fi ndings. First, both types of transfers increase capital stock and profi ts. Transfers also increase the hours worked by the owner, capital stock and profi ts. Transfers also increase the hours worked by the owner, indicating complementarity between capital and labor hours. Second, the return to indicating complementarity between capital and labor hours. Second, the return to the additional capital is around 5-6 percent per month, giving a real annual return the additional capital is around 5-6 percent per month, giving a real annual return well above the market lending rate. Third, the authors develop a model that makes well above the market lending rate. Third, the authors develop a model that makes 5 Nonexperimental evidence on the determinants of the distribution of authority and its effects on fi rm performance is also being established. Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2010) develop a survey instrument to measure the level of centralization of decision making in 4,000 fi rms across 12 countries, which shows that highly centralized structures are more likely to occur in developing countries and where product market competition is low. Wu (2011) exploits a natural experiment and detailed personnel data from a Chinese newspaper to provide evidence on the effect of centralizing decision-making authority on the effort and performance of managerial editors and reporters. In his setting, centralizing authority reduces the effort of managers and increases the effort of workers, overall increasing the quality of the average article. More importantly, authority has a signifi cant impact on incentives despite the fact that reporters were already on high-powered performance pay. precise how missing credit or insurance markets can generate the observed discrepprecise how missing credit or insurance markets can generate the observed discrepancy between returns to capital and lending rates. The balance of evidence indicates ancy between returns to capital and lending rates. The balance of evidence indicates that results are driven by missing credit markets, not by risk aversion to borrowing. that results are driven by missing credit markets, not by risk aversion to borrowing.
Several methodological points are of note. First, using GPS coordinates, the Several methodological points are of note. First, using GPS coordinates, the authors show that the treatment has spillover effects on nearby fi rms. Interestingly, authors show that the treatment has spillover effects on nearby fi rms. Interestingly, the authors show that spillovers are entirely driven by fi rms in the bamboo industry, the authors show that spillovers are entirely driven by fi rms in the bamboo industry, where the harvesting of bamboo is subject to government restrictions and treated where the harvesting of bamboo is subject to government restrictions and treated fi rms crowd out others by purchasing all of the available supply. These fi ndings illusfi rms crowd out others by purchasing all of the available supply. These fi ndings illustrate the potential of fi eld experiments to shed light on the functioning of markets, trate the potential of fi eld experiments to shed light on the functioning of markets, not just fi rms in isolation. Second, the authors show how to deal with an attrition not just fi rms in isolation. Second, the authors show how to deal with an attrition rate that was 5 percent higher for control fi rms than for treatment fi rms by using the rate that was 5 percent higher for control fi rms than for treatment fi rms by using the methodology proposed by Lee (2009) , which estimates upper and lower bounds for methodology proposed by Lee (2009) , which estimates upper and lower bounds for the treatment effect and allows them to show that the estimated treatment effects the treatment effect and allows them to show that the estimated treatment effects and return to capital are robust to attrition. Third, the authors also compare the and return to capital are robust to attrition. Third, the authors also compare the difference between experimental and nonexperimental methods. Compared to a difference between experimental and nonexperimental methods. Compared to a 5.3 percent monthly return to capital estimated via experimental methods, ordinary 5.3 percent monthly return to capital estimated via experimental methods, ordinary least squares, random effects, and fi rm fi xed effects models yield estimates of 2.6, least squares, random effects, and fi rm fi xed effects models yield estimates of 2.6, 1.7, and 0.07 percent, respectively. 1.7, and 0.07 percent, respectively.
McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) implemented the same experiment with McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) implemented the same experiment with 137 small and medium-sized retail fi rms in Mexico, and also fi nd high rates of 137 small and medium-sized retail fi rms in Mexico, and also fi nd high rates of returns to capital, especially for fi rms that report being credit constrained/not returns to capital, especially for fi rms that report being credit constrained/not having access to formal loans. Overall, these fi eld experiments provide a useful having access to formal loans. Overall, these fi eld experiments provide a useful answer to an important question, as well as providing guidance for future fi eld answer to an important question, as well as providing guidance for future fi eld experiments. In particular they illustrate how experiments can go beyond underexperiments. In particular they illustrate how experiments can go beyond understanding the decision process of a single fi rm and provide evidence on the nature standing the decision process of a single fi rm and provide evidence on the nature of spillovers and market interactions. of spillovers and market interactions.
Managerial Capital and Enterprise Training Managerial Capital and Enterprise Training
Economic theory has long taught that managerial capital is an important input Economic theory has long taught that managerial capital is an important input in production (Lucas, 1978; Rosen, 1982) . However, systematic empirical evidence in production (Lucas, 1978; Rosen, 1982) . However, systematic empirical evidence about the effects of managerial capital was, until recently, almost nonexistent-in about the effects of managerial capital was, until recently, almost nonexistent-in part because of the diffi culties in measuring managerial capital. In addition, manapart because of the diffi culties in measuring managerial capital. In addition, managerial capital seems likely to be related to characteristics of the fi rm and perhaps gerial capital seems likely to be related to characteristics of the fi rm and perhaps to unobservable traits about management and workers in ways that made it very to unobservable traits about management and workers in ways that made it very diffi cult to draw causal inferences. diffi cult to draw causal inferences.
Two recent methodological improvements have led to substantial progress in Two recent methodological improvements have led to substantial progress in this area. First, some studies have focused on management practices that can be this area. First, some studies have focused on management practices that can be measured systematically. As they discussed in this journal, Bloom and Van Reenen measured systematically. As they discussed in this journal, Bloom and Van Reenen (2010b) have developed a standard measure of management practices and used it (2010b) have developed a standard measure of management practices and used it to survey managers in 6,000 manufacturing fi rms in 17 developed and developing to survey managers in 6,000 manufacturing fi rms in 17 developed and developing countries. Their work shows a robust correlation between the quality of managecountries. Their work shows a robust correlation between the quality of management practices and fi rm performance both across and within countries. Second, ment practices and fi rm performance both across and within countries. Second, researchers have begun designing fi eld experiments aimed at evaluating the causal researchers have begun designing fi eld experiments aimed at evaluating the causal impact of managerial practices on fi rm performance. impact of managerial practices on fi rm performance.
To evaluate the effect of business training on the performance of microenterTo evaluate the effect of business training on the performance of microenterprises, Karlan and Valdivia (2011) and Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar (2011) examine prises, Karlan and Valdivia (2011) and Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar (2011) examine the experience of clients of a microfi nance institution in Peru and the Dominican the experience of clients of a microfi nance institution in Peru and the Dominican Republic, respectively. Both studies randomize microentrepreneurs into a treatRepublic, respectively. Both studies randomize microentrepreneurs into a treatment group that receives fi nancial training, including basic accounting, marketing, ment group that receives fi nancial training, including basic accounting, marketing, and pricing, and into a control group that does not. Common fi ndings emerge and pricing, and into a control group that does not. Common fi ndings emerge from these studies. Neither fi nds an effect of business training on sales, profi ts, from these studies. Neither fi nds an effect of business training on sales, profi ts, or employment. Both fi nd that training reduces business seasonality by increasing or employment. Both fi nd that training reduces business seasonality by increasing sales in "bad" months. These are intriguing results and should lead to signifi cant sales in "bad" months. These are intriguing results and should lead to signifi cant advances in understanding the constraints faced by microenterprises. advances in understanding the constraints faced by microenterprises. Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2011) develop a fi eld experiBloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2011) develop a fi eld experiment to evaluate the effect of modern management practices on the performance ment to evaluate the effect of modern management practices on the performance of large Indian fi rms in the textile industry. Working in collaboration with a leading of large Indian fi rms in the textile industry. Working in collaboration with a leading international management consulting fi rm, the researchers offered free manageinternational management consulting fi rm, the researchers offered free management consulting to a randomly selected group of 14 out of 20 plants belonging to ment consulting to a randomly selected group of 14 out of 20 plants belonging to 17 large manufacturers. A further eight plants belonging to the same fi rms were 17 large manufacturers. A further eight plants belonging to the same fi rms were also surveyed. The consulting intervention targeted 38 key practices that capture also surveyed. The consulting intervention targeted 38 key practices that capture standard manufacturing principles in high-income countries. standard manufacturing principles in high-income countries.
The design of this fi eld experiment illustrates the trade-off between sample The design of this fi eld experiment illustrates the trade-off between sample size and the complexity of the intervention needed to study a cross-section of size and the complexity of the intervention needed to study a cross-section of large fi rms. Consultancy and data collection costs-$75,000 per treated fi rm, large fi rms. Consultancy and data collection costs-$75,000 per treated fi rm, $20,000 per control plant-limited the sample size to 20 units. Standard statistical $20,000 per control plant-limited the sample size to 20 units. Standard statistical tests that rely on asymptotic properties cannot be used in this context because tests that rely on asymptotic properties cannot be used in this context because the number of observations is too small. Collecting data over a long time horizon the number of observations is too small. Collecting data over a long time horizon partially helps as there are procedures that rely on asymptotic approximations partially helps as there are procedures that rely on asymptotic approximations along the time dimension (Ibragimov and Müller, 2010) . In addition, statisalong the time dimension (Ibragimov and Müller, 2010) . In addition, statistical power can be sustained in such small samples by collecting data directly tical power can be sustained in such small samples by collecting data directly from machine logs, focusing on similar fi rms using identical technologies, and from machine logs, focusing on similar fi rms using identical technologies, and collecting high-frequency repeated measures (McKenzie, 2011) . The key fi nding collecting high-frequency repeated measures (McKenzie, 2011) . The key fi nding is that managerial capital improved quality and effi ciency, reduced inventory, and is that managerial capital improved quality and effi ciency, reduced inventory, and raised average productivity by 11 percent. The resulting increase in yearly profi ts raised average productivity by 11 percent. The resulting increase in yearly profi ts was estimated to be over 90 percent of the market cost of the consulting services was estimated to be over 90 percent of the market cost of the consulting services that fi rms would have paid in the fi rst year. that fi rms would have paid in the fi rst year.
Again, such fi ndings raise the obvious questions of why profi table practices Again, such fi ndings raise the obvious questions of why profi table practices were not adopted before the intervention. Interviews with owners and senior were not adopted before the intervention. Interviews with owners and senior managers reveal that incorrect beliefs about the profi tability of the practices managers reveal that incorrect beliefs about the profi tability of the practices were the main cause of non-adoption, but even when these incorrect beliefs were were the main cause of non-adoption, but even when these incorrect beliefs were pointed out, fi rms were very slow to adopt the new practices. Most of the owners pointed out, fi rms were very slow to adopt the new practices. Most of the owners attributed this to lack of time. However, it also seemed that most Indian textile attributed this to lack of time. However, it also seemed that most Indian textile fi rms did not need to adopt the new practices in order to compete with other fi rms did not need to adopt the new practices in order to compete with other domestic fi rms as high tariffs shielded them from international competition. The domestic fi rms as high tariffs shielded them from international competition. The study thus raises what seems to be a recurrent question in fi eld experiments with study thus raises what seems to be a recurrent question in fi eld experiments with fi rms: What are the constraints that discourage fi rms from making changes that fi rms: What are the constraints that discourage fi rms from making changes that clearly seem to be profi table? clearly seem to be profi table?
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Labor Labor
An alternative kind of between-fi rms study, more common in high-income An alternative kind of between-fi rms study, more common in high-income countries, are fi eld studies designed to measure discriminatory practices by exogcountries, are fi eld studies designed to measure discriminatory practices by exogenously varying the applicant pool available to fi rms. The typical "audit" study enously varying the applicant pool available to fi rms. The typical "audit" study presents employers with two sets of job applicants who are identical along all presents employers with two sets of job applicants who are identical along all relevant employment characteristics except the characteristic of interest, like race, relevant employment characteristics except the characteristic of interest, like race, gender, or age (Heckman and Siegelman, 1993; Riach and Rich, 2002) . gender, or age (Heckman and Siegelman, 1993; Riach and Rich, 2002) . Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) design a fi eld experiment along these lines Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) design a fi eld experiment along these lines by sending résumés with randomly assigned white-or black-sounding names to over by sending résumés with randomly assigned white-or black-sounding names to over 1,300 help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers. They also randomly vary 1,300 help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers. They also randomly vary the quality of the résumé by adding experience, skills, or honors. They fi nd that the quality of the résumé by adding experience, skills, or honors. They fi nd that white names receive 50 percent more callbacks for an interview than black names. white names receive 50 percent more callbacks for an interview than black names. This racial gap is uniform across occupation, industry, and employer size. AdditionThis racial gap is uniform across occupation, industry, and employer size. Additionally, the return to higher-quality résumés is higher for whites than blacks, implying ally, the return to higher-quality résumés is higher for whites than blacks, implying that the racial gap is larger for more-qualifi ed applicants. that the racial gap is larger for more-qualifi ed applicants.
The authors fi ndings are consistent with a model of lexicographic search The authors fi ndings are consistent with a model of lexicographic search whereby the employers stop reading (and hence fail to see all credentials) once they whereby the employers stop reading (and hence fail to see all credentials) once they see a black name. While such practice is indeed consistent with the fi ndings, more see a black name. While such practice is indeed consistent with the fi ndings, more work is needed to provide direct evidence on its relevance compared to statistical and work is needed to provide direct evidence on its relevance compared to statistical and taste-based discrimination models. If the search process is lexicographic, future work taste-based discrimination models. If the search process is lexicographic, future work needs to understand why such methods emerged in the fi rst place. Time constraints needs to understand why such methods emerged in the fi rst place. Time constraints are one possible ingredient here; indeed, although time constraints are rarely made are one possible ingredient here; indeed, although time constraints are rarely made explicit in economic modeling of fi rms, they may help to explain experimental results explicit in economic modeling of fi rms, they may help to explain experimental results in many diverse contexts. More generally, these types of audit experiments could be in many diverse contexts. More generally, these types of audit experiments could be fruitfully applied to analyze the practical relevance of other applicant traits such as fruitfully applied to analyze the practical relevance of other applicant traits such as gender, education, and past employment history. This would allow one to provide a gender, education, and past employment history. This would allow one to provide a consistent picture of fi rms' preferences and constraints on hiring decisions. consistent picture of fi rms' preferences and constraints on hiring decisions.
Practical Considerations Practical Considerations
The growing literature using fi eld experiments on fi rms has begun to provide The growing literature using fi eld experiments on fi rms has begun to provide insights on long-standing areas of economic research related to fi rm behavior. In insights on long-standing areas of economic research related to fi rm behavior. In the hope that some readers may be interested in undertaking this kind of research, the hope that some readers may be interested in undertaking this kind of research, in this section we discuss two practical considerations that arise in doing such experin this section we discuss two practical considerations that arise in doing such experiments: design and ethical issues. In the fi nal discussion, we then draw together iments: design and ethical issues. In the fi nal discussion, we then draw together some common lessons from the studies presented to highlight some areas to which some common lessons from the studies presented to highlight some areas to which we think future research should be directed. we think future research should be directed.
Design Design
The design of a fi eld experiment ought to be grounded in economic theory so The design of a fi eld experiment ought to be grounded in economic theory so that null and alternative hypotheses can be mapped back to an underlying model of that null and alternative hypotheses can be mapped back to an underlying model of fi rm behavior. Once null and alternative hypotheses are well defi ned, this will guide fi rm behavior. Once null and alternative hypotheses are well defi ned, this will guide the collection of primary and secondary data. the collection of primary and secondary data.
Researchers then need to choose the unit over which to introduce experiResearchers then need to choose the unit over which to introduce experimental variation: for fi eld experiments involving fi rms, this can involve engineering mental variation: for fi eld experiments involving fi rms, this can involve engineering experimental variation across fi rms or within a fi rm. For the former, the unit might experimental variation across fi rms or within a fi rm. For the former, the unit might be inputs, whose characteristics are exogenously varied across fi rms, or the unit be inputs, whose characteristics are exogenously varied across fi rms, or the unit might be fi rms themselves who are then exogenously assigned to different environmight be fi rms themselves who are then exogenously assigned to different environments. This latter type of fi eld experiment design remains scarce, but we discuss ments. This latter type of fi eld experiment design remains scarce, but we discuss potential developments below. For experimentation within fi rms, the unit is most potential developments below. For experimentation within fi rms, the unit is most often workers, although plants or fi rm divisions might also be used. For experimenoften workers, although plants or fi rm divisions might also be used. For experimentation at the worker level, at one end of the spectrum, workers are simultaneously tation at the worker level, at one end of the spectrum, workers are simultaneously randomly assigned to control and treatment groups, as is typically done in policy randomly assigned to control and treatment groups, as is typically done in policy evaluation and in randomized controlled trials. At the other end of the spectrum, evaluation and in randomized controlled trials. At the other end of the spectrum, all workers are treated but the timing of the treatment is exogenously chosen by the all workers are treated but the timing of the treatment is exogenously chosen by the researchers. Each approach has its own costs and benefi ts, and these are likely to researchers. Each approach has its own costs and benefi ts, and these are likely to differ across fi rm settings. differ across fi rm settings.
The main benefi t of having a control group is that common trends can be The main benefi t of having a control group is that common trends can be weeded out by using a difference-in-differences estimator. The main cost is that weeded out by using a difference-in-differences estimator. The main cost is that the estimated effect of the intervention might be biased because the control group the estimated effect of the intervention might be biased because the control group might react to might react to not having received the treatment. Whether this creates a positive having received the treatment. Whether this creates a positive or negative bias depends on whether the control group tries to differentiate themor negative bias depends on whether the control group tries to differentiate themselves from, or to emulate, the treated group. This is a fi rst-order issue in fi eld selves from, or to emulate, the treated group. This is a fi rst-order issue in fi eld experiments with fi rms, where it is often harder to isolate treatment and control experiments with fi rms, where it is often harder to isolate treatment and control groups geographically or informationally, so those in a control group are likely to groups geographically or informationally, so those in a control group are likely to fi nd out about the experiments. The threat of contamination can be eliminated fi nd out about the experiments. The threat of contamination can be eliminated by separating the groups, but this typically causes them to be subject to different by separating the groups, but this typically causes them to be subject to different workplace conditions, making the control group a weaker counterfactual for what workplace conditions, making the control group a weaker counterfactual for what would have happened to the treated in the absence of treatment. would have happened to the treated in the absence of treatment.
Switching all agents between control and treatment groups at an exogenously Switching all agents between control and treatment groups at an exogenously chosen time has the benefi t of eliminating the contamination bias; also, to increase chosen time has the benefi t of eliminating the contamination bias; also, to increase statistical power, the effect of treatment can be estimated by comparing each agent statistical power, the effect of treatment can be estimated by comparing each agent to that same agent without the treatment, thus eliminating all sources of unobservto that same agent without the treatment, thus eliminating all sources of unobservable heterogeneity (List, Sadoff, and Wagner, 2010) . The cost of this approach is able heterogeneity (List, Sadoff, and Wagner, 2010) . The cost of this approach is that the estimated effect of the treatment might be biased because of unobservthat the estimated effect of the treatment might be biased because of unobservable determinants of changes in behavior. This concern might be addressed by able determinants of changes in behavior. This concern might be addressed by collecting a suffi ciently long time series during both treatment and control periods, collecting a suffi ciently long time series during both treatment and control periods, or, if seasonality or cyclicality is a potential threat, by collecting information from a or, if seasonality or cyclicality is a potential threat, by collecting information from a different period during which no treatment was introduced, to purge estimates of different period during which no treatment was introduced, to purge estimates of variation due to such naturally occurring fl uctuations. Switching all agents between variation due to such naturally occurring fl uctuations. Switching all agents between control and treatment groups is a good approach for another, practical reason: control and treatment groups is a good approach for another, practical reason: fi rms often express unwillingness to treat similar workers in the same plant or fi rm fi rms often express unwillingness to treat similar workers in the same plant or fi rm location in different ways. location in different ways.
A recent fi eld experiment illustrates how different randomization strategies A recent fi eld experiment illustrates how different randomization strategies can lead to different estimates. Shi (2010) compares productivity under fi xed wages can lead to different estimates. Shi (2010) compares productivity under fi xed wages and piece rates for workers engaged in tree thinning in a fruit orchard in the state and piece rates for workers engaged in tree thinning in a fruit orchard in the state of Washington. As the fi rm has multiple sites, in one site she switched ten workers of Washington. As the fi rm has multiple sites, in one site she switched ten workers simultaneously from wages to piece rates and observed them for three days under simultaneously from wages to piece rates and observed them for three days under each treatment, whereas in another site she switched seven workers to piece rates each treatment, whereas in another site she switched seven workers to piece rates and kept another seven as controls with fi xed wages for one day, identifying the effect and kept another seven as controls with fi xed wages for one day, identifying the effect from the difference-in-differences between the two days. The estimated producfrom the difference-in-differences between the two days. The estimated productivity increase is 23 percent in the fi rst design-similar to the estimates in Shearer tivity increase is 23 percent in the fi rst design-similar to the estimates in Shearer (2004) -while the estimated effect increases to 43 percent in the second design. (2004)-while the estimated effect increases to 43 percent in the second design. Shi (2010) reports that workers in the control group learned of the existence of a Shi (2010) reports that workers in the control group learned of the existence of a treatment group and were not pleased. This could have reduced their productivity, treatment group and were not pleased. This could have reduced their productivity, leading to an overestimate of the effect, but her data is not rich enough to shed light leading to an overestimate of the effect, but her data is not rich enough to shed light on the mechanism. Understanding such contamination effects is crucial to being on the mechanism. Understanding such contamination effects is crucial to being able to compare fi ndings across experiments, and such issues are beginning to be able to compare fi ndings across experiments, and such issues are beginning to be explored by fi eld experimenters. explored by fi eld experimenters.
Ethics Ethics
Field experiments involve human subjects and thus typically fall under the Field experiments involve human subjects and thus typically fall under the oversight of an institutional review board run by an institution of higher educaoversight of an institutional review board run by an institution of higher education or a funding agency. In turn, these boards are typically guided by the ethical tion or a funding agency. In turn, these boards are typically guided by the ethical principles set forth by a U.S. government report called the Belmont Report (named principles set forth by a U.S. government report called the Belmont Report (named after the conference center where it was drafted in 1978). The three fundamental after the conference center where it was drafted in 1978). The three fundamental ethical principles in the Belmont Report for all human subjects research are respect ethical principles in the Belmont Report for all human subjects research are respect for persons, benefi cence, and justice. for persons, benefi cence, and justice.
6 6 Recent years have seen some convergence in Recent years have seen some convergence in institutional review board practices across institutions. institutional review board practices across institutions.
One question of particular interest to economists is whether all participants One question of particular interest to economists is whether all participants in an experiment must consent in advance, as the knowledge of participating in in an experiment must consent in advance, as the knowledge of participating in an experiment may bias the results. A common rule is that institutional review an experiment may bias the results. A common rule is that institutional review boards may waive informed consent and allow the use of such "deception" boards may waive informed consent and allow the use of such "deception" if certain certain conditions are met: First, the research involves no more than minimal risk. Second, conditions are met: First, the research involves no more than minimal risk. Second, the waiver will not impact adversely subjects' rights and welfare, which includes no the waiver will not impact adversely subjects' rights and welfare, which includes no reduction in compensation, employment benefi ts, or mental well-being. (Moreover, reduction in compensation, employment benefi ts, or mental well-being. (Moreover, if subjects do not wish to participate in the research there is to be no adverse effect if subjects do not wish to participate in the research there is to be no adverse effect on them either.) Third, the research could not practically be carried out without on them either.) Third, the research could not practically be carried out without the waiver. Finally, subjects will be provided with additional pertinent information the waiver. Finally, subjects will be provided with additional pertinent information about participation-a condition which can often be met by debriefi ng subjects at about participation-a condition which can often be met by debriefi ng subjects at the end of the study. the end of the study.
The granting of waivers of informed consent varies across institutional review The granting of waivers of informed consent varies across institutional review boards. Some simply allow the waiver. Other boards require subjects to be informed boards. Some simply allow the waiver. Other boards require subjects to be informed that they are part of a research study (rather than an "experiment"), that they can that they are part of a research study (rather than an "experiment"), that they can opt out of the study without any consequence, and that they are provided with the opt out of the study without any consequence, and that they are provided with the contact details of the researcher. This need not compromise the conduct of fi eld contact details of the researcher. This need not compromise the conduct of fi eld experiments within fi rms as long as such requirements are equally applied to treatexperiments within fi rms as long as such requirements are equally applied to treatment and control groups. ment and control groups.
A distinctive characteristic of fi eld experiments with fi rms that has important A distinctive characteristic of fi eld experiments with fi rms that has important implications for how fi eld experiments should be judged by institutional review implications for how fi eld experiments should be judged by institutional review boards is that fi rms are likely to experiment on their own, or be advised by for-profi t boards is that fi rms are likely to experiment on their own, or be advised by for-profi t consultancies, and the ethical guidelines they must adhere to in such cases are likely consultancies, and the ethical guidelines they must adhere to in such cases are likely to be much less stringent than those faced by academics. to be much less stringent than those faced by academics.
7 7 Academic researchers might Academic researchers might then be crowded out by for-profi t evaluation consultancies that are not subject to the then be crowded out by for-profi t evaluation consultancies that are not subject to the same ethical requirements, and this might reduce the involvement of academics in same ethical requirements, and this might reduce the involvement of academics in fi eld experiments and create a strong selection among the type of experiments that fi eld experiments and create a strong selection among the type of experiments that can be subject to scientifi c scrutiny. The severity of this concern will depend on the can be subject to scientifi c scrutiny. The severity of this concern will depend on the evolving attitude of institutional review boards with regard to academics' involvement evolving attitude of institutional review boards with regard to academics' involvement with fi rms. For instance, will researchers be allowed to advise fi rms on experiments with fi rms. For instance, will researchers be allowed to advise fi rms on experiments that do not meet academic ethical guidelines but would be implemented regardless that do not meet academic ethical guidelines but would be implemented regardless of academic involvement? Will researchers be allowed to analyze data from experiof academic involvement? Will researchers be allowed to analyze data from experiments that do not meet academic ethical guidelines but were initiated by the fi rms ments that do not meet academic ethical guidelines but were initiated by the fi rms themselves? The answers to these questions will have profound implications for the themselves? The answers to these questions will have profound implications for the future of fi eld experiments with fi rms. future of fi eld experiments with fi rms.
Common Lessons and Future Directions Common Lessons and Future Directions
Field experiments are at the heart of a growing empirical literature that is Field experiments are at the heart of a growing empirical literature that is expanding economists' understanding of fi rm behavior. In this concluding discusexpanding economists' understanding of fi rm behavior. In this concluding discussion, we draw together some common lessons from these studies and suggest some sion, we draw together some common lessons from these studies and suggest some future directions. future directions.
A common feature of most fi eld experiments with fi rms is that they identify A common feature of most fi eld experiments with fi rms is that they identify partial equilibrium effects, as they typically affect only one or at most a sample of partial equilibrium effects, as they typically affect only one or at most a sample of fi rms within one industry. General equilibrium effects might of course differ from fi rms within one industry. General equilibrium effects might of course differ from the partial equilibrium effects, depending in part on whether the returns to the the partial equilibrium effects, depending in part on whether the returns to the experimental innovation can be competed away. For instance, if high-powered experimental innovation can be competed away. For instance, if high-powered incentives benefi t the fi rm by attracting better workers, no fi rm can gain by offering incentives benefi t the fi rm by attracting better workers, no fi rm can gain by offering high-powered incentives when all fi rms do the same. In contrast, if high-powered high-powered incentives when all fi rms do the same. In contrast, if high-powered incentives increase workers' productivity, then all fi rms can benefi t from offering incentives increase workers' productivity, then all fi rms can benefi t from offering high-powered incentives, thus increasing aggregate productivity. high-powered incentives, thus increasing aggregate productivity.
The question that then naturally arises is: if these aggregate gains are possible, The question that then naturally arises is: if these aggregate gains are possible, why don't fi rms reap them? Indeed, one puzzling fi nding is that almost all the fi eld why don't fi rms reap them? Indeed, one puzzling fi nding is that almost all the fi eld experiments reviewed have brought large benefi ts to the fi rm. In part, this pattern experiments reviewed have brought large benefi ts to the fi rm. In part, this pattern arises because fi rms would not agree to implement experiments that are expected arises because fi rms would not agree to implement experiments that are expected to have detrimental consequences! Yet the fact that in so many cases researchers to have detrimental consequences! Yet the fact that in so many cases researchers have managed to increase profi ts appears at odds with the common assumption have managed to increase profi ts appears at odds with the common assumption that fi rms are pressured by competitive forces to make at least close-to-optimal that fi rms are pressured by competitive forces to make at least close-to-optimal choices. For example, the incentive schemes introduced in our fi eld experiments choices. For example, the incentive schemes introduced in our fi eld experiments at the fruit-picking fi rm increased productivity and profi ts, and were later kept at the fruit-picking fi rm increased productivity and profi ts, and were later kept in place by the fi rm. Likewise, the modern managerial practices introduced by in place by the fi rm. Likewise, the modern managerial practices introduced by Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2011) at large textile fi rms in Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2011) at large textile fi rms in India increased profi ts and were kept in place after the end of the experiment. India increased profi ts and were kept in place after the end of the experiment. In both cases, the owners attributed the failure to explore these options earlier as In both cases, the owners attributed the failure to explore these options earlier as due to the high opportunity cost of their time. The same constraint seems to be due to the high opportunity cost of their time. The same constraint seems to be binding both in very competitive environments, as experienced by the soft fruit binding both in very competitive environments, as experienced by the soft fruit fi rm we analyzed in Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2007) , and in settings where fi rm we analyzed in Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2007) , and in settings where competition is very mild, as for the fi rms surveyed by Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, competition is very mild, as for the fi rms surveyed by Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2011) . McKenzie, and Roberts (2011) .
This fi nding suggests promising new avenues for future research on the This fi nding suggests promising new avenues for future research on the importance of time constraints in fi rms. The importance of time constraints at importance of time constraints in fi rms. The importance of time constraints at the top tiers of organizational hierarchies has been recognized in theory (Bolton and the top tiers of organizational hierarchies has been recognized in theory (Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994; Garicano, 2000) , but evidence on whether and how managers Dewatripont, 1994; Garicano, 2000) , but evidence on whether and how managers allocate their time to maximize fi rm performance is scant. Bandiera, Guiso, Prat, allocate their time to maximize fi rm performance is scant. Bandiera, Guiso, Prat, and Sadun (2011) have developed a survey methodology to measure how chief and Sadun (2011) have developed a survey methodology to measure how chief executive offi cers spend their time, and show how the pattern of time allocation can executive offi cers spend their time, and show how the pattern of time allocation can be used to provide observational evidence on the internal and external constraints be used to provide observational evidence on the internal and external constraints faced by fi rms. Combining this survey methodology with fi eld experiments holds faced by fi rms. Combining this survey methodology with fi eld experiments holds potential for making substantial progress in understanding these issues. potential for making substantial progress in understanding these issues.
In turn, scarcity of managerial time can be symptomatic of two other problems. In turn, scarcity of managerial time can be symptomatic of two other problems. First, if the owner or chief executive offi cer must control all aspects of the business, First, if the owner or chief executive offi cer must control all aspects of the business, the scope and size of the fi rm is necessarily limited. Delegation of authority and the scope and size of the fi rm is necessarily limited. Delegation of authority and decision making is an essential ingredient for fi rm expansion, and yet we have a very decision making is an essential ingredient for fi rm expansion, and yet we have a very limited empirical understanding of why some owners fail to delegate. Agency problimited empirical understanding of why some owners fail to delegate. Agency problems and the inability to motivate lower-tier managers intuitively seem important, lems and the inability to motivate lower-tier managers intuitively seem important, as reported by the fi rm owners surveyed by Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and as reported by the fi rm owners surveyed by Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2011) , but more evidence is needed on how these can be tackled. Field Roberts (2011) , but more evidence is needed on how these can be tackled. Field experiments that vary the distribution of authority or the agency constraints could experiments that vary the distribution of authority or the agency constraints could potentially provide this. Second, there is often a lack of managers with adequate potentially provide this. Second, there is often a lack of managers with adequate human capital and talent, whether due to a market failure in education or a skewed human capital and talent, whether due to a market failure in education or a skewed distribution of talent. These constraints are not amenable to experimental variation, distribution of talent. These constraints are not amenable to experimental variation, but by providing evidence on the internal constraints of fi rms, fi eld experiments but by providing evidence on the internal constraints of fi rms, fi eld experiments can help guide research on these topics, too. can help guide research on these topics, too.
Our discussion so far has been based on the assumption that fi rms maximize Our discussion so far has been based on the assumption that fi rms maximize profi ts subject to constraints. But rather than focusing on constraints to optimizing profi ts subject to constraints. But rather than focusing on constraints to optimizing behavior, a growing body of observational studies suggests the alternative view that behavior, a growing body of observational studies suggests the alternative view that fi rms might not maximize profi ts, either because they are led by managers who fi rms might not maximize profi ts, either because they are led by managers who enjoy the "quiet life" (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003) or because they are owned enjoy the "quiet life" (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003) or because they are owned by families whose objective function has a nonmonetary component deriving from by families whose objective function has a nonmonetary component deriving from direct control (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006) . A burgeoning body of work uses fi eld direct control (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006) . A burgeoning body of work uses fi eld experiments to understand consumer preferences and optimizing behavior. It is experiments to understand consumer preferences and optimizing behavior. It is worth exploring whether similar strategies could be adopted to shed light on deparworth exploring whether similar strategies could be adopted to shed light on departures from the assumption of profi t maximization by fi rms. tures from the assumption of profi t maximization by fi rms.
Field experimenters have also begun to explore the behavior of not-for-profi ts. Field experimenters have also begun to explore the behavior of not-for-profi ts. While there exists a vibrant literature using fi eld experiments on the fund-raising While there exists a vibrant literature using fi eld experiments on the fund-raising activities of such organizations, many other issues remain unexplored. Theoretical activities of such organizations, many other issues remain unexplored. Theoretical contributions from Benabou and Tirole (2003) and Besley and Ghatak (2005) make contributions from Benabou and Tirole (2003) and Besley and Ghatak (2005) make clear that the provision of incentives for pro-social tasks raises different issues than clear that the provision of incentives for pro-social tasks raises different issues than for private tasks on at least two dimensions: First, to the extent that agents engaged for private tasks on at least two dimensions: First, to the extent that agents engaged in pro-social tasks are intrinsically motivated, fi nancial rewards that might successin pro-social tasks are intrinsically motivated, fi nancial rewards that might successfully elicit effort for private tasks could actually reduce effort if the rewards crowd fully elicit effort for private tasks could actually reduce effort if the rewards crowd out intrinsic motivation. Second, the type of incentive mechanism might affect out intrinsic motivation. Second, the type of incentive mechanism might affect the composition of the pool of agents who choose to participate in the activity. In the composition of the pool of agents who choose to participate in the activity. In particular, high-powered fi nancial incentives might attract individuals who are motiparticular, high-powered fi nancial incentives might attract individuals who are motivated by fi nancial returns instead of individuals who share the pro-social orientation vated by fi nancial returns instead of individuals who share the pro-social orientation of the organization, with undesirable consequences. Laboratory experiments show of the organization, with undesirable consequences. Laboratory experiments show that the effect of fi nancial rewards differs when the task has social value. But fi eld that the effect of fi nancial rewards differs when the task has social value. But fi eld evidence on these issues is scant. evidence on these issues is scant.
Another question, with many practical implications, is how do fi rms and Another question, with many practical implications, is how do fi rms and individuals at different layers of the hierarchy match endogenously based on their individuals at different layers of the hierarchy match endogenously based on their respective characteristics? The fact that many observed outcomes can be ascribed to respective characteristics? The fact that many observed outcomes can be ascribed to endogenous matching is often a limitation of observational studies (Ackerberg and endogenous matching is often a limitation of observational studies (Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002) . Field experiments on discrimination provide some evidence on Botticini, 2002) . Field experiments on discrimination provide some evidence on how fi rms hire workers, but many questions remain open. We envisage fi eld experihow fi rms hire workers, but many questions remain open. We envisage fi eld experiments that create exogenous variation in the parameters of the matching process, ments that create exogenous variation in the parameters of the matching process, by, for instance, varying the information set available to employers and employees, by, for instance, varying the information set available to employers and employees, or by reducing search costs through the introduction of electronic market places or by reducing search costs through the introduction of electronic market places where employers and employees can meet. Advancing the methodology in these where employers and employees can meet. Advancing the methodology in these directions, perhaps in some cases intervening at the level of markets as a whole, directions, perhaps in some cases intervening at the level of markets as a whole, would take fi eld experiments into an exciting new realm. would take fi eld experiments into an exciting new realm.
